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ABSTRACT
Wearable devices, or “wearables,” bring great benefits but
also potential risks that could expose users’ activities with-
out their awareness or consent. In this paper, we report find-
ings from the first large-scale survey conducted to investigate
user security and privacy concerns regarding wearables. We
surveyed 1,782 Internet users in order to identify risks that
are particularly concerning to them; these risks are inspired
by the sensor inputs and applications of popular wearable
technologies. During this experiment, our questions con-
trolled for the effects of what data was being accessed and
with whom it was being shared. We also investigated how
these emergent threats compared to existent mobile threats,
how upcoming capabilities and artifacts compared to exist-
ing technologies, and how users ranked technical and non-
technical concerns to sketch a concrete and broad view of the
wearable device landscape. We hope that this work will in-
form the design of future user notification, permission man-
agement, and access control schemes for wearables.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Wearables are a $700 million, growing industry [2]. With
20% of the general population owning at least one wearable
and 10% using it daily [11], wearables are bringing ubiq-
uitous computing to everyday life. This trend will likely
continue, as 52% of technology consumers are aware of wear-
ables and 33% are likely to buy one [6].
Wearable devices enable many benefits, ranging from in-
teraction with virtual objects in an augmented reality world
to healthier, fitness-data inspired lifestyles. However, wear-
able devices also bring new potential privacy and security
risks that could expose users’ activities without their aware-
ness or consent. Although wearable devices are still in their
infancy, we have already seen manifestations of these risks.
Fitbit’s default privacy settings inadvertently exposed infor-
mation about some of their users’ sexual activity [21]. Pub-
lic discomfort toward facial recognition caused Google to
prohibit Google Glass applications from using facial recog-
nition [29], but still resulted in tech hate crimes against its
users [36, 14]. Google Glass has since been discontinued.
For smartphones, security and privacy risks are generally
addressed by communicating data capture to users. How-
ever, many users are habituated to these notifications, be-
cause they see them frequently, often for things that they do
not care about [17]. Once habituated to seemingly benign
privacy and security warnings, users tend to ignore more
sensitive warnings that are similarly designed [15].
Wearables’ sensor capabilities, continuous access, and ubiq-
uitous presence will result in a firehose of familiar and un-
familiar types of data, at a rate which will likely dwarf the
amount of data currently captured by smartphones. By-
standers of wearable devices have already expressed inter-
est in such communication, desiring notification before data
about them is captured [13]. However, subjecting people to
increased notifications is not a sound option, as it has shown
to lead to negative effects, such as frustration and habitua-
tion [7]. An understanding of user concerns may allow for
targeted and effective communication with the user, inform
design of future permission systems, or provide insight for
access control mechanisms.
The goal of this work is to shape the still-malleable fu-
ture of wearable platforms and interaction models, with re-
search on user-centric concerns. To our knowledge, this is
the first large-scale study to investigate user security and
privacy concerns for wearable devices. Our survey of 1,782
Internet users contributes the following:
• We report how 72 types of data likely to be captured
by wearable devices were perceived by our participants
and rank them by relevance.
• We repeat this across 4 types of recipients to also il-
lustrate the contribution of the data recipient to the
overall perceived risk.
• We sketch a landscape of users’ self-reported concerns
regarding wearable devices, spanning concerns outside
of security and privacy.
• We compare emergent risks with existing risks and find
that participants perceive risks similarly to physical
risks—for instance, facial detection was perceived as
risky as using a lawnmower.
2. METHODOLOGY
To obtain a comprehensive list of possible risks that wear-
able devices might present in the future, we examined the
sensors, capabilities, permissions, and applications of the
most popular wearable devices on the market. At the time of
this study (August 2014) the most popular wearable devices
included the Fitbit fitness tracker, which continuously mon-
itors heartbeat, steps taken, and sleep patterns; the Pebble
smartwatch, which can take pictures, send texts, show noti-
fications from online, and push notifications to services; and
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Google Glass, which can take pictures, record video, and
perform a subset Internet-based tasks such as search, read-
ing emails, etc. These devices’ capabilities and requested
permissions were our inspiration to develop a list of possible
security and privacy risks that users will encounter.
We designed a survey to gauge the relevancy of all these
possible risks. Our survey contained two main sections. A
set of questions presented participants with several scenarios—
something undesirable that might happen with their wear-
able device—and asked them to rate their level of concern
if each scenario were to happen. This was intended to elicit
their perception of the severity and impact of the risk. The
format of this section was based on Felt et al.’s study of
user perceptions of security and privacy risks with mobile
devices [16]. Another set asked participants to compare the
risks and benefits of wearable technologies to those of better-
understood technologies, following the same methodology
from Fischhoff et al.’s seminal study in risk perception [18].
2.1 Related Work
In this section, we describe the two prior works on which
we based our survey format: Felt et al.’s survey of smartphone-
based risks [16] and Fischhoff et al.’s survey of a wide range
of general technology-based risk perceptions [18].
2.1.1 Smartphone Risk Scenarios
Felt et al. previously studied the security concerns of smart-
phone users by conducting a large-scale online survey [16].
Their survey asked 3,115 smartphone users about 99 risk sce-
narios. Participants were asked how upset they would be if
a certain action occurred without their permission. Partici-
pants rated each situation on a Likert scale ranging from“in-
different (1)” to “very upset (5).” Our methodology closely
follows that study, but with scenarios chosen to shed light
on the security and privacy risks of wearable devices.
2.1.2 Technology Risk Perceptions
Fischhoff et al. performed a seminal study of the per-
ceived risks and benefits surrounding 30 widely used tech-
nologies [18]. Participants were asked to separately think
of the risks then benefits, considering all people affected,
long-term effects, and short term effects. Then, the partic-
ipants respectively rated these technologies on a numerical
scale, being instructed to rate the least risky or least bene-
ficial technology a 10 and scaling the ratings linearly (e.g.,
a technology with a risk rating of 20 is considered twice as
risky as compared to a technology with a risk rating of 10).
We apply their methodology to evaluate perceived risks and
benefits of technologies related to wearable computing with
respect to more familiar technologies.
2.2 Survey Questions
Each participant answered 27 questions across 5 sections:
• 2 reading comprehension questions
• 6 questions about wearable computing scenarios
• 2 questions about smartphone scenarios
• 2 Fischhoff-style risk/benefit questions
• 15 demographic questions
We randomized the order participants saw sections of the
survey (with the exception of the comprehension and demo-
graphic questions, which were always first and last, respec-
tively), as well as the order of questions in each section.
2.2.1 Comprehension Questions
Because participants might be biased to specific compa-
nies (e.g., visceral reactions to Google Glass based on pop-
ular media stories), we based our questions on a fictitious
wearable. Thus, the beginning of the survey introduced par-
ticipants to the“Cubetastic3000,” which was the basis for all
questions on wearables risks. We highlighted the capabilities
of this device and described use cases:
Imagine that you are the proud owner of the
Cubetastic3000, a new, high-tech computing de-
vice designed to be worn on your head. Imagine
also that you wear this device all the time, be-
cause it is very lightweight, durable, and conve-
nient.
The Cubetastic3000 has the capability to cap-
ture video, photos, audio, and biometrics (biolog-
ical data about you, such as heart rate). Just like
other devices today, you can install third-party
applications from an app store, and these appli-
cations can use the information that the Cubetas-
tic3000 captures.
With a wide range of applications and capabil-
ities, your device can do all sorts of things, such
as:
—measuring heart rate, breathing, and other things
to keep track of your fitness level and overall health
—look at what you see to provide information
about what’s around you
—allow you to take notes just by telling the de-
vice what you need to remember
—take videos of you or what you see to share with
others
—automatically take photos or video so that you
can replay events that previously happened
—play music that you like for you when it detects
that no one is around
—infer information about you so you don’t need
to log in or search for the same thing over and
over
...and much more!
Since this device is the basis for many of our questions, we
ensured that participants had understood its capabilities by
asking them two multiple-choice comprehension questions.
We filtered out responses from participants who could not
answer these questions.
2.2.2 Wearable Scenarios
We presented scenarios involving data captured by the
Cubetastic3000 and asked participants to rate how upset
they would be if a particular type of data (e.g., video, audio,
name, etc.) was shared without permission with a particular
data recipient (see Figure 1). Responses were reported on
a 5-point Likert scale (from “indifferent” to “very upset”),
following Felt et al. [16]. Questions were of the form:
Figure 1: An example of a wearable scenario ques-
tion participants saw while taking the survey.
“How would you feel if an app on your Cubetas-
tic3000 learned <data> and shared it with <re-
cipient>, without asking you first?”
We combined 72 data types (<data>) with 4 data recipi-
ents (<recipient>) to form an initial pool of 288 questions:
• Your work contacts
• Your friends
• The public
• The app’s server (but didn’t share it with anyone else)
The purpose for using this question format was to deter-
mine how upset participants would be if data were inappro-
priately shared, and the extent to which their reactions were
based on the data type and recipient. Each participant an-
swered 6 questions that were randomly drawn from a pool
of 293: the 288 described here, plus 5 that we describe in
the next section (Section 2.2.3).
2.2.3 Smartphone Scenarios
We presented participants with a second set of scenarios to
control for the type of device being used. Rather than using
the previous pool of 288 <data> and <recipient> combina-
tions, we selected 5 scenarios that Felt et al. found least and
most concerning to their participants [16]:
1. How would you feel if an app on your <device> vi-
brated your phone without asking you first?
2. How would you feel if an app on your <device> con-
nected to a Bluetooth device (like a headset) without
asking you first?
3. How would you feel if an app on your <device> un-
muted a phone call without asking you first?
4. How would you feel if an app on your <device> took
screenshots when you were using other apps, without
asking you first?
5. How would you feel if an app on your <device> sent
premium (they cost money) calls or text messages, with-
out asking you first?
In the previously described section of our survey, <de-
vice> was set to “Cubetastic3000” and not every participant
received one of these questions (i.e., these 5 questions were
among the pool of 293 questions from which participants
were randomly assigned 6). In the separate smartphone sec-
tion of the survey, every participant received exactly two of
these questions, where <device> was set to “smartphone.”
This allowed us to perform controlled comparisons based on
whether the same misbehavior was occurring on a smart-
phone (i.e., a better understood device) or the Cubetas-
tic3000 (i.e., a fictitious wearable device).
2.2.4 Risk and Benefit Assessment
In addition to investigating reactions to particular sce-
narios, we examined broad perceptions of new technologies
and how those compared to perceptions of other understood
technologies. We modeled this section after a seminal risk
perception study by Fischhoff et al. [18], in which partici-
pants ranked technologies by their relative risk and bene-
fit to society. We ask participants to perform this exercise
for 4 technologies previously examined by Fischhoff et al.:
handguns, motorcycles, lawnmowers, and electricity. These
technologies were chosen to span varying levels of risks and
benefits.
Our goal was to ask about familiar technologies such as
the Internet, general and specific wearable artifacts, and a
range of new capabilities. To do this, we asked partici-
pants to evaluate one of 20 technologies relevant to wear-
ables along 4 previously studied technologies. The 20 tech-
nologies were: Internet, email, laptops, smartphones, smart
watches, fitness trackers, Google Glass, Cubetastic3000, dis-
crete camera, discrete microphone, facial recognition, facial
detection, voice recognition, voice-based emotion detection,
location tracking, speech-to-text, language detection, heart
rate detection, age detection, and gender detection.
To parallel Fischhoff et al.’s risk perception study, we gave
our participants a similar prompt to numerically express the
perceived gross risk/gross benefit over a long period of time
for all parties involved. We randomized whether they per-
formed the ranking for risks or benefits first. The prompt is
listed in Appendix A. The question format was as follows:
Fill in your <risk/benefit> numbers for the fol-
lowing:
Handguns:
Motorcycles:
Lawnmowers:
<Wearable Technology>:
Electricity:
2.2.5 Additional Questions
The exit portion of the survey contained demographic
questions asking for age, gender, and education. We then
asked about wearables ownership so we could control for
prior exposure. An open-ended question on what would be
the most likely risks associated with wearable devices was in-
cluded to catch user concerns more broadly. To avoid biasing
the open-ended question, we asked before concluding with
the 10-question Internet Users’ Information Privacy Con-
cerns (IUIPC) index [27], which was included so we could
control for participants’ general privacy attitudes.
2.3 Focus Group
We conducted a one-hour focus group to validate our de-
sign, gauge comprehension, and measure fatigue. The focus
group began with participants taking the survey then giv-
ing feedback on the format and the content, noting any in-
structions or questions that were unclear. The focus group
concluded with a discussion of possible benefits and risks of
wearable devices, in order to brainstorm any additional sce-
narios to include. Finally, we compensated participants with
$30 in cash. We recruited all of our focus group participants
from Craigslist. Of the 13 participants, 54% were female,
and ages ranged from 18 to 64 (µ = 36.1, σ = 15.3). Ed-
ucation backgrounds ranged from high school to doctorate
degrees, and professions included student, artist, marketer,
and court psychologist.
2.4 Recruitment and Analysis Method
We recruited 2,250 participants over August 7–13, 2014
via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We restricted participants
to those over 18, living in the United States, and having a
successful HIT completion rate of 95% or above. We com-
pensated each participant with $1.75 upon successfully com-
pleting the survey. Based on incorrect responses to either of
the two comprehension questions, we filtered out 366 (16% of
2,250) participants. We filtered out an additional 99 partic-
ipants (4% of 2,250) due to incomplete responses, and three
participants for being under 18, leaving us with a total sam-
ple size of 1,782. Of these, 57.9% were male (1,031), 41.0%
were female (731), and 20 participants declined to state their
genders. Ages ranged from 18 to 73, with a mean of 32.1 (σ
= 10.37). Almost half of our participants had completed a
college degree or more (49.2% of 1,782), which includes the
219 (12.3% of 1,782) who reported graduate degrees. While
our sample was younger and more educated than the U.S.
population as a whole, we believe it is still consistent with
the U.S. Internet-using population.
In performing our analysis in the next section, we chose
to focus on the very upset rate (VUR) of each scenario. The
VUR is defined as the percentage of participants who re-
ported a ‘5’ on the Likert scales. We use the VURs rather
than the average of all Likert scores for the same reasons as
Felt et al.: the VUR does not presume that the ratings, rang-
ing from “indifferent” to “very upset,” are linearly spaced.
Additionally, most people are likely to be upset, at least a
little, in all scenarios, because a device is taking action with-
out permission (rating distribution: “1”= 759, “2” = 918, “3”
= 1,452, “4”’ = 2,421, “5” = 8,344). Thus, the distinguishing
factor is whether a participant was maximally upset, rather
than if they were upset. A limitation of this approach is
that it only allows us to make relative comparisons between
scenarios, rather than being able to definitively state how
upset people might be if a single scenario were to occur.
We followed Fischhoff et al.’s methodology and did not
normalize the numerical responses. Rather, we report me-
dians and quartiles, which are not impacted by outliers.
For the open-ended question at the end (i.e., additional pri-
vacy concerns), two researchers independently coded 1,782
responses, with an initial agreement rate of 89.7%. The re-
searchers discussed and resolved any disagreements so that
the final codings reflect unanimous agreement.
3. RESULTS
In this section, we present participants’ responses to the
various data-sharing scenarios, and discuss how and which
various factors contributed to their risk perceptions. We also
discuss participants’ risk/benefit assessment of various new
technologies relative to well-established technologies. We
conclude the section with participants’ self-reported con-
cerns about the biggest risks in owning wearable devices.
3.1 Concern Factors
Many factors can potentially impact participants’ concern
levels: the data being shared, with whom the data is shared,
and device in question. We analyze each factor individu-
ally, as well as present a statistical model of participants’
concerns as a function of the above factors and additional
demographic traits.
3.1.1 Data Type
Based on our statistical models (later reported in Section
3.3.2), we observe that the largest effect on participants’
VURs stemmed from the data being shared; with whom the
data is shared and which device the user is interacting with
had weaker impacts on overall VURs. The most and least
concerning data types are listed in Table 1, and the full list
can be seen in Table 9 in Appendix C.
Participants were most concerned about photos and videos,
especially if they contained embarrassing content, nudity,
or financial information. As seen in Table 1, photos and
videos accounted for five of the top ten concerns, and are
almost unanimously considered to be concerning. Infor-
mation that could be used to impersonate someone (e.g.,
usernames/passwords for websites), or photos of someone at
home, were also among the most concerning data types.
Participants were least concerned about data that could
be collected through observations of public behavior, such
as demographics (e.g., age, gender, language) or information
available to advertisers (e.g., TV shows watched, music on
device). As seen in Table 1, participants’ responses had a
greater amount of variance. This greater variance and over-
all decreased concern may be because of uncertainty with
how the data would be used, or because the financial, so-
cial, or physical consequences would be less immediate.
Although certain data is considered unanimously upset-
ting to have shared, it is interesting to note that no data was
considered unanimously non-upsetting to have shared, nor
were there any data types that evoked strong disagreement
between participants (i.e., bimodal). Generally, the average
concern magnitude was inversely correlated with the stan-
dard deviation, which suggests the presence of ceiling effects
for the most concerning data types. For the complete ranked
list of data types in this study, see Appendix C.
3.1.2 Data Recipient
A statistically significant difference in VUR exists between
data shared with an application versus data shared with
human recipients. On average, 42% of participants stated
that they would be “very upset” if their data was shared
with only an application’s servers, whereas the VURs for
friends (70%), work contacts (75%), and the public (72%)
were almost double (Table 2). A chi-square test indicated
that these differences were statistically significant (Table 3).
However, these effect sizes were small: the largest effect was
between work contacts and an app’s server (φ = 0.11); while
the VUR for sharing with work contacts was significantly
higher than sharing with friends, the effect size was negligi-
ble (φ = 0.004).
We note that this chi-square test violates the assumption
of independent observations, since participants responded
to multiple scenarios with multiple recipients. But based
on the randomization of treatments and large sample size,
we do not believe that this significantly impacted our re-
sults. Similarly, we are unaware of a more appropriate test,
given our data format. Cochran’s Q requires binary out-
comes (i.e., participants would have had to answer only one
question for each data recipient, preventing us from ade-
quately controlling for data type) and a repeated measures
Rank Data VUR σ Distribution
1 video of you unclothed 95.97% 0.31
2 bank account information 95.91% 0.35
3 social security number 94.84% 0.26
4 video entering in a PIN at an ATM 92.67% 0.47
5 photo of you unclothed 92.59% 0.46
6 photo of you that is very embarrassing 91.39% 0.55
7 username and password for websites 89.55% 0.62
8 credit card information 88.98% 0.56
9 video of you that is very embarrassing 88.41% 0.53
10 photo of you at home 87.50% 0.60
...
64 eye patterns (for eye tracking) 40.51% 1.27
65 exercise patterns 38.66% 1.26
66 when you are happy or having fun 34.75% 1.27
67 television shows watched 30.20% 1.40
68 when you are busy or interruptible 29.50% 1.26
69 music on device 28.06% 1.43
70 your heart rate 27.50% 1.40
71 age 24.29% 1.43
72 language spoken 15.86% 1.49
73 gender 15.00% 1.45
Table 1: The 10 most and least upsetting data types, across all recipients. For the complete list of all data
types across all recipients, see Appendix C.
ANOVA requires normality (our data was not normally dis-
tributed). Nonetheless, we repeated our analysis using only
one randomly-selected data point per participant and found
that our selected test was robust to this violation. There-
fore, we conclude that participants were significantly more
concerned about having their data seen by a human versus
an application, though differences between specific human
groups such as the public, friends, and work contacts were
not as significant. Our results motivate mechanisms for data
taint tracking and accidental data sharing prevention.
However, we do not claim that there are no distinctions
between the friends, public, and work contact recipients.
People are more comfortable sharing certain data types with
certain human recipients. For instance, participants were
significantly uncomfortable sharing if they were lying, ner-
vous, or stressed to work contacts compared to the rest of
the data recipients. Table 12 Appendix C shows the com-
plete VUR and rankings of all data types by recipient.
3.1.3 Device
Each participant answered two questions drawn from a
set of five smartphone misbehaviors. To compare these mis-
behaviors with misbehaviors on the Cubetastic3000, we in-
Rank Recipient VUR sigma Distribution
1 Work Contacts 75.16% 0.94
2 Public 72.41% 0.98
3 Friends 69.47% 1.02
4 App’s Server 42.28% 1.15
Table 2: The overall upset rate for all recipients.
cluded these same five questions amongst the pool of 293
Cubetastic3000 scenarios, modifying the device in question.
In this manner, all 1,782 participants received two smart-
phone questions, while 159 participants received at least one
of these five Cubetastic3000 misbehavior questions. Across
all participants, the VUR was 46.7% (of 1,782) for smart-
phones, whereas the VUR increased to 58.8% (of 159) for
same misbehaviors on the Cubetastic3000. The VURs for
both devices for these questions are in Table 4.
To ensure independence of observations, we performed
a Mann-Whitney U test to compare participants’ average
Recipients χ2 p-value n φ
Work-App 565.910 <0.0001 5,083 0.111
Public-App 481.776 <0.0001 5,1988 0.093
Friends-App 381.653 <0.0001 5,096 0.075
Friends-Work 20.39 <0.0001 5,037 0.004
Friends-Public 5.41 <0.0200 5,142 0.001
Work-Public 5.00 <0.0253 5,129 0.001
Table 3: Results of a chi-square test to examine
VUR based on data recipient, across all data points.
Misbehavior Cubetastic3000 Smartphone
All 58.79% 46.67%
Vibration 14.81% 6.14%
Bluetooth 44.12% 19.86%
Unmuted Call 87.10% 58.44%
Screenshot 52.78% 55.74%
Premium Calls/Texts 86.49% 91.94%
Table 4: VURs for the five questions about device
misbehaviors described in Section 2.2.3, contrasting
smartphones with the Cubetastic3000.
VURs for the Cuebtastic3000 scenarios (i.e., 159 partic-
ipants) to the remaining participants’ average VURs for
the smartphone scenarios (i.e., 1,623 participants). This
difference is statistically significant (U = 108, 664.0 with
p < 0.0005) but the effect size is very small (r = 0.08).
Because of this, we did not further reduce our statistical
power by separately comparing the five misbehaviors. We
conclude that users are likely more wary of misbehaviors
on wearables than smartphones, but this difference is likely
negligible. The entire effect may be due to participants’ fa-
miliarity with smartphones, and therefore this effect may
disappear as they increasingly encounter more wearables.
3.2 Risk and Benefit Rankings
We ask participants to rate new capabilities related to
wearable technologies (e.g., facial recognition) in terms of
their benefits and risk. We also ask them about technolo-
gies with which they were likely to be more familiar (e.g.,
smartphones and laptops) and two specific wearable devices,
Google Glass and the fictitious Cubetastic3000. To calibrate
our results, we ask about four well-established technologies
studied by Fischhoff et al. [18]. We find that participants
generally rated technologies related to wearables as being
low-risk comparatively to other technologies (Figure 2). Ta-
bles 10 and 11 in Appendix C shows participants’ median,
quartiles, and distributions of risks and benefit ratings for
all technologies.
Participants were prompted to rate technologies with re-
spect to all considerations (see Appendix A), including risk
of physical harm to bystanders, financial cost, distress, mis-
use, or impact on public, personal, and private life. Partic-
ipants may have still evaluated the risks with an emphasis
toward physical risk and without an emphasis on privacy
risk. Among the five presented options, the wearable-related
one is the only one without some physical risk scenario, and
physical risk is a clear, tangible risk.
We examined participants’ perceptions, and therefore re-
sponses may not be reflective of actual risks or benefits.
However, they also reflect the general public’s exposure to
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Figure 2: Participants’ median risk-benefit ratings
of technologies examined by Fischhoff et al. [18],
which we used for calibration, alongside familiar
technologies (e.g., laptops, the Internet, etc.), wear-
able technologies, as well as two specific wearable
devices (Google Glass and the Cubetastic3000).
these technologies and show that people perceive specific
risks and benefits. We suspect that the similarity in as-
sessments between the various wearable technologies are be-
cause most people are not consciously aware of the possibili-
ties and that performing this experiment longitudinally may
yield more interesting results, as these technologies become
pervasive (and more familiar to participants).
As a group, participants rated more familiar technologies
as more beneficial. We believe this is the result of exposure
to these technologies—most people use these technologies
daily and therefore see what the benefits of these technolo-
gies are. It is true that people perceive unfamiliar technolo-
gies as less beneficial at the moment, but this will change as
the use of these technologies evolve and adoption increases.
Most calibration technologies, with the exception of elec-
tricity, were seen as lower benefit than the others. However,
Google glass and Cubetastic3000 were about equally bene-
ficial, and gender and age recognition were less beneficial.
We find that the more familiar a participant was with a
technology, the more likely they were to rate it as risky.
Again, we believe that this is due to the exposure to these
technologies. Of the wearable technologies, the riskiest tech-
nologies included facial recognition, the Internet, and dis-
crete cameras, whereas the remainder of the technologies
were seen as having minimal, equivalent risk levels (i.e., a
median of “10”). We did not test the differences in risk be-
tween the different wearable-related technologies for statis-
tical significance, but given their minimal spread compared
to the calibration options, the differences appears to be neg-
ligible. Interestingly, privacy risks were perceived as being
comparable to physical risks; for instance, the capacity for
facial detection on a wearable device was perceived as being
almost as risky as interacting with a lawnmower.
3.3 Open-Ended Concerns for Wearables
We captured participants’ reactions to wearable devices
as a whole by asking the following open-ended question:
What do you think are the most likely risks asso-
ciated with wearable devices?
Concern Responses Frequency
Privacy 452 25.32%
Being Unaware 275 15.40%
Health Risk 191 10.70%
Safety 185 10.42%
Social Impact 157 8.80%
Financial Cost 151 8.46%
Security 144 8.07%
Accidental Sharing 69 3.87%
Miscellaneous 57 3.19%
None 51 2.86%
Social Stigma 39 2.18%
False Information 33 1.85%
Don’t know 31 1.74%
Aesthetics 19 1.06%
Don’t care 11 0.62%
Table 5: The most common open-ended risks asso-
ciated with owning a wearable device.
This question was asked with demographics questions, but
before any IUIPC questions (which asked a lot of direct
privacy-related questions, to avoid biasing the recipients).
The participants were presented with a blank box to write
in, with no character limit to their open-ended responses.
Table 5 shows common user concerns related to wearable
devices. Appendix B details the responses categorized in
each coding label. Most are related to privacy and security,
but this open-ended data gives a sense of what broad cat-
egories of concerns are most relevant to users. This can be
used to guide research in unexplored use cases.
In addition to privacy and security in the general sense,
significant concerns included being unaware of what the de-
vice is collecting, doing, or which information it is using
(Being Unaware). Other orthogonal concerns included long-
term health effects caused from wearing the device such as
cancer from EMF waves (Health) and safety hazards from
wearing the device, such as distractions that cause car ac-
cidents (Safety). Interestingly, participants were also con-
cerned with resulting changes in social behaviors, such as
dependence on devices or spending less time with loved ones
(Social Impact).
3.3.1 Demographic Factors
We see that privacy is a main concern for wearables users.
Additionally, we show that privacy preferences should also
be a consideration for configuring a user’s device. A partic-
ipant’s self-reported level of privacy concerns is the biggest
demographic predictor of participants’ VUR rate. This is
determined by the IUIPC scale [27]. A Spearman correla-
tion yielded a statistically significant effect between average
IUIPC scores and VUR (ρ = 0.446, p < 0.0005), which sug-
gests responses to questions were mostly based on privacy
preferences. Additionally, we observed that age was another
significant predictor of VUR (ρ = 0.121, p < 0.0005), but
we suspect that this effect is due to the significant correla-
tion between age and IUIPC scores (ρ = 0.188, p < 0.0005).
Others have observed that older individuals tend to be more
privacy protective [40].
While we initially observed an effect on VURs based on
whether or not participants claimed to already own wear-
ables (57.0% vs. 60.8%, respectively; Mann-Whitney U =
Parameters χ2 df QIC
(Intercept) 423.96 1 13,209.1
(Intercept) 207.07 1 12,551.49
IUIPC (covariate) 368.5 1
Gender (covariate) 6.30 1
(Intercept) 411.66 1 12,458.86
Data Recipient 599.72 3
(Intercept) 418.02 1 11,382.75
Data Type 1,141.40 71
(Intercept) 66.18 1 9,609.65
Data Recipient 617.25 3
Data Type 1,288.51 71
IUIPC (covariate) 105.73 1
Gender (covariate) 9.74 1
IUIPC × Gender 8.33 1
Table 6: Goodness-of-fit metrics for various binary
logistic models of our data using general estimating
equations to account for repeated measures. The
columns represent the Wald test statistic for each
parameter and the overall Quasi-Akaike Information
Criterion (QIC) for each model. Each parameter
listed was statistically significant at p < 0.005.
202, 896, p < 0.032), this difference did not remain signif-
icant upon correcting for multiple testing (Bonferroni cor-
rected α = 0.01). The effect of a participant’s gender also
did not remain significant upon correcting for multiple test-
ing. We observed no correlation between a participant’s ed-
ucation level and VUR.
3.3.2 Regression Models
In order to examine the relative effect of each factor on
participants’ VURs, we constructed several statistical mod-
els to predict whether a participant would be “very upset”
with a given scenario based on the data type, data recipient,
and their demographic factors (i.e., age, education, gender,
and privacy attitudes). We performed binary logistic regres-
sions using generalized estimating equations, which account
for our repeated measures experimental design (i.e., each
participant contributed multiple data points).
We created several models using two independent vari-
ables as predictors: data and recipient. Because the device
(i.e., whether they were using the Cubetastic3000 or a smart-
phone) is only varied for the five smartphone misbehaviors
listed in Section 2.2.3, we removed these five from our mod-
els, resulting in a total of 72 types of data shared with 4
possible recipients. We used the following demographic fac-
tors as covariates: age, gender, education, wearable device
ownership (yes/no), and mean IUIPC score. For each model,
we performed Wald’s test to examine the model effects at-
tributable to each of these parameters. The only covariates
that had an observable effect on our models were partici-
pants’ gender and IUIPC scores, which also exhibited an in-
teraction effect with each other. Thus, we opted to remove
the other covariates from our analysis. Table 6 shows the
various models that we examined and the Quasi-Akaike In-
formation Criterion (QIC), which is a goodness-of-fit metric
for model selection that also accounts for complexity (lower
relative values indicate better fit). As shown, the type of
data being shared (data type) was found to be the strongest
predictor of a high VUR.
While these models illustrate the relative weights that
users place on information when determining a scenario as
truly upsetting, one shortcoming of this approach is its gen-
eralizability: the data predictor is categorical and limited to
the data that we specifically chose for this study. To make
our data set more generalizable to other use cases, we coded
each data type in two ways: in terms of broad descriptions
of the type of data (e.g., video, audio, etc.) and the type of
risk it presents. Two researchers agreed on a codebook and
independently coded each of the 72 data types.
The data types fell into these six categories:
1. Photo
2. Video
3. Audio
4. Behavioral Information
5. Biometric Information
6. Demographic Information
While the first three categories are self-explanatory, the
latter three categories are all based on different user charac-
teristics. We defined behavioral information as observations
about the user’s activities; biometric information as mea-
surements of the user’s body; and demographic information
as non-biometric information about the user’s traits.
The risks for data types fell into these five categories:
1. Financial: the loss of money or property.
2. Image: the loss of control over one’s self-image (e.g.,
publicizing something embarrassing).
3. Medical: the disclosure of medical information.
4. Physical: physical harm to the user.
5. Relationships: damage to the user’s inter-personal
relationships.
After independently coding, the researchers met to resolve
any disagreements, such that the results reflect unanimity.
There was 83% agreement prior to resolution. Cohen’s κ was
0.81 for the data categories and 0.75 for the risk categories,
both indicating “excellent” agreement [19].
With regard to data types, the most concerning type of
data is video (78.0%), which was ranked similarly to pho-
tos (76.2%). Next are audio (66.8%) and demographic data
(65.4%), followed by behavioral (53.1%) and biometric (46.3%)
data. We suspect that demographic data was more concern-
ing because it included information such as a Social Security
Number, bank account information, and other financial in-
formation. We chose to categorize them as such as they
are non-biological descriptors of the user. We were very
surprised that biometric information was seen as relatively
benign compared to the other broad categories of data. One
hypothesis is that since most home users do not use biomet-
ric authentication, they may have an inaccurate understand-
ing of the types of systems that might be at risk if biometric
data is stolen and abused.
With regard to the presented risks, we observed that aver-
age VURs were highest for financial information disclosure
(82.0%). Information regarding relationships (69.2%), phys-
ical safety (66.4%), and self-image (65.8%) followed. VURs
were lowest for medical information disclosure (47.4%). One
reason why medical risks were ranked relatively low is that
this category broadly covered scenarios involving data about
the user’s health, but also included more basic medical in-
formation, such as age, gender, and emotional state. As
mentioned in Section 3.1.1, participants saw these as pub-
licly observable and unconcerning.
Parameters χ2 df QIC
(Intercept) 442.66 1 12,727.42
Risk 405.18 4
(Intercept) 380.39 1 12,681.86
Data Category 439.45 5
(Intercept) 256.15 1 12,061.87
Risk 157.84 4
Data Category 183.90 5
Risk × Data Category 259.81 8
(Intercept) 62.65 1 10,406.35
Risk 205.21 4
Data Category 250.35 5
Recipient 546.89 3
IUIPC (covariate) 103.94 1
Gender (covariate) 9.80 1
IUIPC × Gender 8.21 1
Risk × Data Category 303.44 8
Recipient × Risk 39.14 12
Table 7: Metrics for additional binary logistic mod-
els of our data using general estimating equations to
account for repeated measures. The columns rep-
resent the Wald test statistic for each parameter
and the overall Quasi-Akaike Information Criterion
(QIC) for each model. Each parameter listed was
statistically significant at p < 0.005.
Using these two new variables as additional independent
variables (and removing the previous data type variable), we
created a second set of models. Because these risk categories
and mediums are less likely to change over time, models
that take these into account are likely to be more useful
and less likely to be overfit. What these models show us is
that both risk and medium are relatively strong predictors
by themselves, and have an even stronger interaction effect.
When the data recipient and covariates are added to the
model, the resulting goodness-of-fit is not much worse than
that of the model using the actual data type.
4. DISCUSSION
4.1 Limitations
One of the limitations of our experiment is that our par-
ticipants might not have knowledge or interest in wearables
and their capabilities; 83% of our participants reported that
they do not own a wearable. Because of this, our partic-
ipants may be over or underestimating the risk, stemming
form an unawareness of what can be inferred from the data,
not having clear relations of new technology with respect
to familiar ones, and a higher likelihood of being influenced
by reports of recent events.1 For instance, biometrics were
generally not a concern for our participants, although there
are many security and privacy implications [33]. Our par-
ticipants also did not differentiate between the benefits of
risks of various new capabilities.
We recruited both wearable users and non-users in order
to yield a more representative sample of the general popula-
tion. We could have easily recruited only wearables owners
1Recently, stories of exploding batteries were in the
news [26], which were explicitly reported as a concern in
our open-ended question.
or people specifically interested in wearables. However, that
would have its own biases and limitations. At the time of
this writing, about 85% of the general population do not own
wearable devices [30, 11], indicating our study is reflective
of the current population.
Because of the privacy paradox, participants’ stated re-
sponses may differ from how they may react to these same
scenarios in real life [31, 23]. At the same time, our results
do reflect actual perceptions of wearable devices and the
associated privacy scenarios involving them. This is an un-
avoidable, yet important distinction to make with of studies
of this nature: our primary goal was to examine perceptions
and preferences, so that future systems can be designed with
these in mind. We do not expect that such systems will
satisfy users in all situations, however, we believe that user-
centered design will still be a vast improvement over post
hoc approaches (or ignoring user concerns altogether).
4.2 Future Research Directions
We find that although people have opinions on applica-
tions which are familiar, users do not know the risk associ-
ated with new data or unfamiliar applications. We hope our
work both informs the direction for future research to secure
video, audio, and other currently considered sensitive sen-
sor input channels, but also encourage work for contextual
and user-input- independent permission models and access
control schemes.
Further work can be done to expand various aspects of
this study. Investigating more fine-grained data types (e.g.,
investigating specific instances of location data, versus lo-
cation data in general) would be a useful endeavor to gain
further insight into user perceptions. Adding additional re-
cipients, such as “advertisers” or “acquaintances” may lead
to more nuanced results. Additionally, the open-ended con-
cerns illuminate areas of possible future research, such as
the design of a distraction-free interface to prevent safety
issues, and how to minimize negative social impact.
5. ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK
5.1 Wearables and Privacy
We are rapidly moving towards a world of ubiquitous sens-
ing and data capture, with ensuing privacy challenges [1, 32,
8]. Roesner et al. urge the community to address potential
concerns for wearable devices before the technologies become
widespread [35] and explore the unique and difficult prob-
lems these devices present in terms for law and policy [34].
Many researchers have worked to study how privacy can
be preserved in the presence of ubiquitous devices. Exam-
ples of such efforts include frameworks to design for pri-
vacy [4, 9, 25], protocols for anonymous communication [12],
evaluation metrics for privacy [37], and privacy models [22,
24]. Our work aims to augment works like these with an
understanding of what privacy means to the end user.
5.2 Lessons form Smartphones
Research shows that perceptions of risk change based on
the particular device being used. Chin et al. found that
users’ attitudes toward security and privacy for smarphones
significantly differed from attitudes towards traditional com-
puting systems, stemming from differences in how people
used these systems [10]. Undoubtedly, this will hold true for
wearables as well as wearables have a sparse, world-driven
interaction model.
Tsai et al. found that when mobile users get feedback
about releasing data, such as who has viewed location infor-
mation, it greatly impacts future behaviors [39]. Although
this type of feedback is not provided to smartphone users,
there is potential for impacting wearables users and shaping
their behaviors so that they keep users safe.
5.3 User Perceptions
While risk communication for the physical world has been
examined for several decades (e.g., [18, 28]), research into ef-
fectively communicating computer-based risks has only re-
cently been researched. For example, both Garg et al. and
Blythe et al. show that due to varying perceptions and abili-
ties that correlate with demographic factors, computer-based
risk communication should employ some degree of demo-
graphic targeting [20, 5]. While this work is likely applicable
to wearable computing risk communication, we believe that
a better understanding of users’ risk perceptions in this do-
main is warranted, prior to examining risk communication.
One limitation of user perceptions is that people do not
always have enough information to make privacy-sensitive
decisions. Even if users did have this information, it has
been shown that users often trade off long-term privacy for
short-term benefits [3]. Furthermore, actual behavior may
deviate from stated privacy preferences [38]. However, un-
derstanding user concerns is a necessary first step not only
for risk communication, but preventative measures in gen-
eral against breaches of privacy and security in a new threat
landscape.
6. CONCLUSION
Our survey of 1,784 Internet users, is the first large-scale
study to investigate user-centric security and privacy con-
cerns for wearable devices. We contribute a comprehensive
ranking of possible risks associated with wearable devices,
across various recipients. We calibrate our results with mo-
bile devices and existing technologies; additionally, we verify
with an open-ended question and find that privacy and se-
curity are at the top of user’s overall concerns. Wearables
are still in their infancy. Perceptions of situations and capa-
bilities will change rapidly with advancements and increased
exposure. However, there is not much work done to deter-
mine which threats in the emerging threat landscape are
pertinent to focus on. Inspection of possible data concerns
agree with previous studies of smartphone studies to find
that video capture and financial data to be most sensitive.
Various systems which detect and take actions for sensitive
objects in photos and videos will be critical as wearables
and other devices become more ubiquitous. We also find
that users’ self-reported privacy preferences are correlated
with how participants may react, even with respect to situ-
ations that they are unfamiliar with. Permissions and access
control mechanisms which do not depend on user inputs can
still benefit from being informed by user preferences. We
hope that this work has given a comprehensive overview of
user concerns and inform designs of future privacy and se-
curity work for wearable devices.
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APPENDIX
A. FISCHHOFF PROMPTS
We would like to ask you to rate the <risks/benefits> as-
sociated with each of the following technologies.
Risks: Consider all types of risks: the risk of physical
harm or death, the risk to others or bystanders, the finan-
cial cost of the technology, any distress caused by the tech-
nology, what the consequences would be if the technology was
misused, any impact on the public, work, or personal life,
and other considerations. (e.g. for electricity, consider the
risk of electrocution, the pollution caused by coal, the risk
that miners need to take to mine the coal, the cost to build
the infrastructure to deliver electricity, etc.) Give a global
estimate over a long period of time (say, a year) of both
intangible and tangible risks.
Do not consider the costs or risks associated with these
items. It is true, for example, that sometimes swimmers
can drown. But evaluating such risks is not your present job.
Your job is to assess the gross benefits, not the net benefits
which remain after the costs and risks are subtracted out.
Please rate the following technologies below with a number.
We know that this might be a bit hard to do, but please try
to be as accurate as possible, adjusting the numbers until
they feel they are right for you. Start with the least risky
technology at 10 and assign higher numbers for the more
risky technologies. (For instance, a technology rated 14 is
half as risky as a technology rated 28.)
Benefits: Consider all types of benefits: how many jobs
are created, how much money is generated directly or indi-
rectly, how much enjoyment is brought to people, how much
a contribution is made to the people’s health and welfare,
what this technology promotes, and so on. (e.g. for swim-
ming, consider the manufacture and sale of swimsuits, the
time spent exercising, the social interactions during swim-
ming, and the sport created around the activity.) Give a
global estimate over a long period of time (say, a year) of
both intangible and tangible benefits.
Do not consider the costs or benefits associated with these
items. It is true, for example, that electricity also creates a
market for home appliances. But evaluating such benefits is
not your present job. Your job is to assess the gross risks,
not the net risks which remain after the costs and risks are
subtracted out.
Please rate the following technologies below with a number.
We know that this might be a bit hard to do, but please try to
be as accurate as possible, adjusting the numbers until they
feel they are right for you. Start with the least beneficial
technology at 10 and assign higher numbers for the more
beneficial technologies. (For instance, a technology rated 34
is twice as beneficial as a technology rated 17.)
B. CODING LABEL DEFINITIONS
Researchers coded the self reported answers as follows:
Privacy: “privacy,” mention of personal details, spying.
Security: “security,” mention of malware, hacking.
GPS tracking: “location,”“GPS,” mention of monitoring.
Being Unaware: mention of using, collecting, and disclos-
ing data without permission.
False information: inaccurate or maliciously false data.
Health Risk: mention of radiation, cancer, or other effects.
Safety: mention of distractions causing car crashes and in-
juries, violence due to the device, injuries from malfunctions.
Discomfort: mention of eye strain, headache, irritation.
Financial cost: cost of buying or using the device.
Theft: mention of device theft.
Social Impact: mention of dependency, distance from peo-
ple, changes in decision making, etc.
Social Stigma: mention of judgment, hate, or bystanders.
Aesthetics: mention of fashion or looking dorky.
Miscellaneous: odd comments, uncommon concerns.
None: “None,” mention of no threat, or no real concerns
Don’t know: “do not know,” general confusion
Don’t care: “ do not care,” nonchalant answers
C. CONCERN FACTORS
We show the full, fine-grained results of our survey in this
appendix. This includes how participants had ranked each
technology in response to the Fischhoff-style questions, the
VUR rates for all seventy-two data types, across all recipi-
ents and by recipient, and the details of the full regression
models used in our analyses.
Technology Q1 Median Q3 Distribution
Location Tracking 10.0 10.0 20.0
Speech To Text 10.0 10.0 10.0
Discreet Micro-
phone
10.0 10.0 20.0
Smartwatches 10.0 10.0 10.0
Language Detection 10.0 10.0 10.0
Laptops 10.0 10.0 15.0
Smartphones 10.0 10.0 20.0
Google Glass 10.0 10.0 20.0
Cubetastic 10.0 10.0 30.0
Gender Detection 10.0 10.0 13.5
Voice Recognition 10.0 10.0 15.0
Voice Based Emo-
tion Detection
10.0 10.0 15.0
Fitness Trackers 10.0 10.0 10.0
Age Detection 10.0 10.0 15.0
Facial Detection 10.0 10.0 25.0
Email 10.0 10.0 18.0
Heart Rate Detec-
tion
10.0 10.0 10.0
Discreet Camera 12.0 10.0 30.0
Internet 15.0 10.0 31.0
Facial Recognition 17.0 10.0 30.0
Lawnmower 20.0 12.0 30.0
Electricity 25.0 15.0 40.0
Motorcycle 45.0 27.0 70.0
Handgun 60.0 40.0 100.0
Table 10: Risk rankings of various technologies in
response to the Fischoff-style prompt.
Technology Q1 Median Q3 Distribution
Gender Detection 10.0 10.0 15.0
Age Detection 12.0 10.0 22.0
Discreet Micro-
phone
15.0 10.0 20.0
Cubetastic 15.0 10.0 30.0
Fitness Trackers 18.5 10.0 30.0
Voice Based Emo-
tion Detection
20.0 10.0 30.0
Facial Detection 20.0 10.0 34.0
Discreet Camera 20.0 15.0 30.0
Google Glass 20.0 12.0 40.0
Smartwatches 20.0 10.0 35.0
Motorcycle 20.0 12.0 40.0
Handgun 20.0 10.0 30.0
Facial Recognition 22.0 12.5 42.5
Lawnmower 24.0 15.0 40.0
Speech To Text 25.0 15.0 40.0
Voice Recognition 25.0 15.0 40.0
Language Detection 35.0 15.0 60.0
Heart Rate Detec-
tion
40.0 26.0 65.0
Location Tracking 40.0 20.0 70.0
Email 50.0 29.0 77.5
Smartphones 50.0 30.0 75.0
Laptops 60.0 40.0 80.0
Internet 65.0 45.0 100.0
Electricity 88.0 50.0 100.0
Table 11: Benefit rankings of various technologies in
response to the Fischoff-style prompt.
Rank Question VUR σ Distribution
1 video of you unclothed 95.97 0.31
2 bank account information 95.91 0.35
3 social security number 94.84 0.26
4 video entering in a PIN at an ATM 92.67 0.48
5 photo of you unclothed 92.59 0.45
6 photo of you that is very embarrassing 91.39 0.56
7 username and password for websites 89.55 0.62
8 credit card information 88.98 0.56
9 video of you that is very embarrassing 88.41 0.53
10 photo of you at home 87.5 0.60
11 audio recording of work conversations 86.82 0.76
12 video of entering in a passcode to a door 85.53 0.62
13 audio recording of phone conversations 85.16 0.61
14 amount of money you have 84.44 0.61
15 video of you intoxicated 83.21 0.72
16 when you have sex 81.95 0.82
17 how much debt you have 81.12 0.54
18 video of you at home 81.05 0.60
19 photo of you intoxicated 78.95 0.82
20 photo of you at random 78.76 0.85
21 audio recording of conversations 78.13 0.83
22 medical conditions 77.7 0.86
23 video of you at random 76.19 0.59
24 video of you off-guard 76.0 0.62
25 photo of your work or workplace 74.62 0.90
26 username for websites 73.44 0.83
27 address 72.61 0.86
28 audio recording you captured 72.55 0.70
29 photo of you off-guard 72.55 0.77
30 photo downloaded from internet 71.81 0.90
31 photo others sent you 71.63 1.03
32 video others sent you 70.59 0.81
33 video of your work or workplace 70.54 0.90
34 fingerprint 70.12 0.86
35 when you were lying nervous or stressed 69.74 0.91
36 audio recording of you (voice notes) 69.59 0.91
Table 8: VUR for all data types (1-36), across all recipients.
Rank Question VUR σ Distribution
37 medication taken 69.49 1.01
38 videos already on device 68.89 0.88
39 photo of your signature 68.07 0.84
40 web history 66.44 1.01
41 photos taken on device 66.21 1.02
42 home address 65.0 0.97
43 fine-grained location tracking (+/- cm) 63.51 0.99
44 photo of people at random 61.94 1.06
45 video downloaded from the internet 61.49 1.00
46 when you are alone 61.27 0.99
47 location tracking (+/- m) 61.24 1.08
48 videos of people at random 61.04 0.95
49 where you are currently going 60.87 0.97
50 recording of sound around you 60.45 0.94
51 people you spend time with 60.0 1.13
52 workplace address 58.09 1.16
53 sounds on device (notifications, etc) 54.4 1.29
54 phone usage 51.95 1.22
55 purchased products 50.0 1.09
56 when you are sick or healthy 48.17 1.27
57 how close you are to interacting people 46.98 1.12
58 feelings (based on biometrics) 46.81 1.31
59 computer usage 44.93 1.16
60 eating patterns 42.86 1.27
61 name 42.54 1.40
62 sleeping patterns 40.56 1.34
63 eye patterns (for eye tracking) 40.51 1.27
64 exercise patterns 38.66 1.26
65 when you are happy or having fun 34.75 1.27
66 television shows watched 30.2 1.40
67 when you are busy or interruptible 29.5 1.26
68 music on device 28.06 1.43
69 heart rate 27.5 1.40
70 age 24.29 1.43
71 language spoken 15.86 1.49
72 gender 15.0 1.46
Table 9: VUR for all data types (37-72), across all recipients.
Question All Friends Public Work App
video of you unclothed 95% (1) 97% (4) 94% (10) 100% (1) 90% (2)
bank account information 95% (2) 94% (10) 95% (7) 100% (1) 90% (1)
social security number 94% (3) 100% (1) 100% (1) 93% (9) 88% (3)
video entering in a PIN at an ATM 92% (4) 100% (1) 93% (12) 87% (20) 88% (4)
photo of you unclothed 92% (5) 96% (6) 91% (16) 100% (1) 77% (6)
photo of you that is very embarrassing 91% (6) 94% (8) 100% (1) 94% (6) 78% (5)
username and password for websites 89% (7) 96% (5) 95% (9) 94% (7) 64% (14)
credit card information 88% (8) 100% (1) 93% (13) 95% (5) 65% (13)
video of you that is very embarrassing 88% (9) 91% (13) 94% (11) 94% (7) 71% (9)
photo of you at home 87% (10) 85% (19) 96% (5) 93% (10) 71% (10)
audio recording of work conversations 86% (11) 94% (9) 96% (6) 100% (1) 53% (24)
video of entering in a passcode to a door 85% (12) 95% (7) 89% (21) 81% (35) 75% (7)
audio recording of phone conversations 85% (13) 93% (11) 97% (4) 90% (14) 56% (20)
amount of money you have 84% (14) 90% (14) 100% (1) 93% (11) 63% (15)
video of you intoxicated 83% (15) 81% (26) 91% (16) 88% (17) 68% (11)
when you have sex 81% (16) 78% (31) 87% (23) 90% (15) 73% (8)
how much debt you have 81%(17) 85% (19) 90% (20) 87% (22) 59% (18)
video of you at home 81% (18) 87% (16) 86% (24) 89% (16) 60% (17)
photo of you intoxicated 78% (19) 80% (27) 90% (18) 87% (23) 53% (25)
photo of you at random 78% (20) 82% (24) 83% (29) 81% (32) 66% (12)
audio recording of conversations 78% (21) 86% (18) 85% (26) 87% (20) 55% (21)
medical conditions 77% (22) 92% (12) 85% (25) 85% (27) 40% (37)
video of you at random 76% (23) 73% (40) 90% (19) 88% (19) 48% (31)
video of you off-guard 76% (24) 85% (21) 79% (34) 91% (13) 53% (23)
photo of your work or workplace 74% (25) 76% (33) 82% (31) 81% (32) 62% (16)
username for websites 73% (26) 90% (15) 74% (43) 84% (28) 50% (29)
address 72% (27) 62% (50) 93% (14) 81% (31) 51% (28)
audio recording you captured 72% (28) 87% (17) 75% (40) 72% (46) 50% (29)
photo of you off-guard 72% (29) 83% (23) 80% (32) 80% (37) 45% (33)
photo downloaded from internet 71% (30) 79% (29) 76% (38) 86% (25) 32% (47)
photo others sent you 71% (31) 85% (21) 84% (27) 75% (44) 41% (35)
video others sent you 70% (32) 82% (24) 95% (7) 80% (37) 30% (49)
video of your work or workplace 70% (33) 74% (36) 83% (28) 70% (49) 51% (26)
fingerprint 70% (34) 77% (32) 80% (32) 70% (48) 55% (22)
when you were lying nervous or stressed 69% (35) 74% (35) 74% (42) 91% (12) 41% (34)
audio recording of you % (voice notes) 69% (36) 80% (28) 78% (35) 88% (18) 38% (39)
medication taken 69% (37) 79% (29) 73% (44) 81% (34) 37% (40)
videos taken on device 68% (38) 58% (52) 82% (30) 79% (40) 51% (27)
photo of your signature 68% (39) 63% (48) 64% (51) 85% (26) 59% (19)
web history 66% (40) 74% (36) 70% (45) 86% (24) 37% (40)
photos already on device 66% (41) 75% (34) 77% (36) 79% (39) 27% (53)
home address 65% (42) 61% (51) 87% (22) 69% (50) 40% (36)
fine-grained location tracking (+/- cm) 63% (43) 73% (39) 76% (37) 78% (41) 30% (50)
photo of people at random 61% (44) 72% (41) 61% (54) 82% (30) 38% (38)
video downloaded from the internet 61% (45) 63% (47) 75% (40) 82% (29) 33% (45)
when you are alone 61% (46) 51% (55) 69% (46) 80% (36) 35% (43)
location tracking (+/- m) 61% (47) 57% (53) 92% (15) 63% (55) 25% (56)
videos of people at random 61% (48) 63% (49) 75% (39) 71% (47) 28% (52)
where you are currently going 60% (49) 74% (36) 68% (48) 65% (54) 35% (44)
recording of sound around you 60% (50) 71% (42) 64% (50) 75% (43) 35% (42)
people you spend time with 60% (51) 71% (42) 60% (55) 76% (42) 31% (48)
workplace address 58% (52) 69% (45) 64% (49) 57% (61) 46% (32)
sounds on device % (notifications, etc) 54% (53) 70% (44) 59% (56) 66% (52) 22% (58)
phone usage 51% (54) 67% (46) 56% (57) 68% (51) 15% (64)
purchased products 50% (55) 57% (54) 55% (58) 62% (57) 26% (54)
when you are sick or healthy 48% (56) 40% (64) 61% (52) 62% (58) 26% (55)
how close you are to interacting people 46% (57) 50% (57) 61% (53) 51% (62) 13% (66)
feelings (based on biometrics) 46% (58) 50% (57) 55% (58) 63% (56) 18% (61)
computer usage 44% (59) 51% (56) 52% (60) 45% (63) 28% (51)
eating patterns 42% (60) 41% (62) 45% (62) 75% (45) 12% (67)
name 42% (61) 50% (57) 68% (47) 26% (71) 32% (46)
sleeping patterns 40% (62) 43% (61) 41% (63) 62% (59) 21% (59)
eye patterns % (for eye tracking) 40% (63) 48% (60) 50% (61) 61% (60) 6% (71)
exercise patterns 38% (64) 33% (67) 34% (66) 66% (52) 16% (63)
when you are happy or having fun 34% (65) 40% (64) 32% (69) 43% (65) 24% (57)
television shows watched 30% (66) 38% (66) 33% (67) 36% (68) 11% (68)
when you are busy or interruptible 29% (67) 40% (63) 28% (70) 36% (68) 17% (62)
music on device 28% (68) 4% (72) 37% (64) 42% (66) 20% (60)
heart rate 27% (69) 21% (68) 36% (65) 44% (64) 9% (70)
age 24% (70) 17% (69) 33% (67) 36% (67) 14% (65)
language spoken 15% (71) 17% (70) 18% (72) 28% (70) 27% (53)
gender 15% (72) 15% (71) 19% (71) 15% (72) 9% (69)
Table 12: The VUR of all questions for all recipients.
